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BAR BRIEFS
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In Federal Deposit Ins. Corporation, Pltf. and Respt. vs. C. 0. Leverson, Deft. and Applt.
That the record is examined and it is held that no actual fraud is
shown in the transaction wherein the defendant transferred to a former
owner certain shares of stock in a state bank which the defendant had
acquired for the purpose of enabling him to qualify as a director.
That where an act amends a section of the statute "to read as follows"
and sets forth the entire section as amended, it is to be construed as introduced into the place of the original section and operates as a repeal of
anything contained in the old section and omitted from the amendment.
That Chapter 95, S. L. 1937 which amended chapter 96, section 22,
S. L. 1931 omitted the provision that "Such individual liability shall continue for one year after the recording on the books of the association of
any transfer for a sale of stock by any stockholder or stockholders" and
by such omission repealed the provision for the continuation of the superadded liability of a bank stockholder after a recorded bona fide transfer
of the stock contained in the former act.
That a receiver of an insolvent state bank who brings an action to
recover superadded liability on bank stock represents creditors of the
defunct bank with right no greater than the creditors he represents.
That creditors who became such after a statutory provision continuing liability of bank stockholders after transfer of their stock was repealed
may not assert any liability against the former stockholders based on the
repealed provision. Appeal from the District Court of Grant County,
Harvey J. Miller, J. REVERSED. Opinion of the court by Morris, Ch. J.
In Margaret Kelsch, Pltf. and Applt., vs. John M. Miller, Deft. and
Respt.
That in the instant case it is -held, for reasons stated in the opinion:(a) That the time when the right for redemption would expire was
stated definitely and accurately in the notice of expiration of period of
redemption on land sold to the county at tax sale.
(b) That the sum stated in such notice as the amount required to be
paid to effect redemption was not in excess of the amount required to be
paid for such purpose.
That a notice of expiration of period of redemption from a tax sale
which contains the recitals and gives the information prescribed by law,
is not vitiated because the notice contains other recitals which gives additional information not required to be given, which is beneficial rather
than harmful and can not possibly operate to the prejudice of anyone entitled to be served, or who is served, with such notice.
That in the instant case a tract of land was sold to the county, at the
tax sale held in December, 1935, for the delinquent taxes against it for the
year 1934. Notice of expiration of period of redemption was issued and
served in May, 1940. For reasons stated in the opinion, it is held, that it
was proper to include in the amount that would be required to be paid to
effect a redemption all delinquent taxes against the land subsequent to
the tax sale and prior to the notice of expiration of period of redemption.
From a judgment of the district court of Stark County, Berry, J., plaintiff
appeals. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the court by Christianson, J.
In Ada S. Stutsman, a resident, citizen and taxpayer of the City of
Mandan, brings this action for herself and for and on behalf of all other
taxpayers of the City of Mandan, Pltf. and Applt., vs. S. E. Arthur, City
Auditor, et al., Defts., Grand Lodge of the Ancient Order of United Workmen of North Dakota, a domestic corporation, Deft. and Respt.
That chapter 196, Sess. Laws N. D. 1927, as amended by chapter 170,
Sess. Laws N. D. 1929, permits municipalities to issue funding bonds for
the purpose of refunding public improvement warrants to the extent of
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deficiencies resulting from the failure to collect special assessments due
the funds on which the warrants are drawn.
That Section 3716, Comp. Laws N. D. 1913 prior to the amendment
thereof did not authorize a municipality to assume general liability on
special improvement warrants where such liability resulted from deficiencies in special assessment funds due to the failure of property owners
to pay assessments.
That where the appropriation of public funds or the creation of public
debt is primarily for public purposes it is not necessarily rendered violative
of constitutional provisions against gifts and loans of public credit by an
incidental result which may be of private benefit but if the result is chiefly
that of private benefit an incidental or even ostensible public purpose will
not save its constitutionality.
That purchasers of warrants and bonds of municipalities are charged
with notice of the law with respect thereto including constitutional limitations on the power of the issuing municipalities.
That Chapter 196, Sess. Laws N. D. 1927 as amended by chapter 170,
Sess. Laws N. D. 1929 in so far as it permits the issuance of bonds to refund special improvement warrants issued prior to the time municipalities
were permitted to become generally liable for improvement fund deficiencies is violative of Section 185 of the North Dakota Constitution.
That the limitation provided by section 7381, Comp. Laws N. D. 1913
as to the time when actions may be con -menced applies to equitable as well
as to legal causes of action.
That section 22, chapter 196, Sess. Laws N. D. 1927 which provides
a limitation of sixty days against challenging the validity of bonds that
have been sold pursuant to the provisions of the act cannot be construed
to provide by implication a similar limitation against actions involving
bonds exchanged pursuant to the provisions of chapter 170, Sess. Laws
N. D. 1929.
That where a municipality issues bonds for a purpose forbidden by
the constitution and by ordinance attempts to impose an irrepealable levy
upon the property of the general taxpayers of a municipality, which levy
is in specific and varying amounts for each year during the period covered
thereby, the ten year statute of limitations provided -by section 7381, Comp.
Laws N. D. 1913 does not begin to run against an action to enjoin the
spreading and collection of annual assessments of the installments of the
levy until the taxing authorities attempt to spread the annual levies. Such
an action may be maintained even though commenced more than ten years
after the passage of the ordinance or the spreading of the first annual
assessment thereunder.
That a resident taxpayer has a right to bring an action in behalf of
himself and all other taxpayers similarly situated to enjoin the unlawful
disposition of public funds and the fact that he himself has been dilatory
does not estop him from maintaining the action.
That in order that a remedy may be denied upon the ground of laches
there must appear in addition to mere lapse of time some circumstances
from which the defendant or some other person may be prejudiced or there
must be such lapse of time that it may be reasonably supposed that
prejudice will result if the relief sought is allowed.
Appeal from the District Court, Morton County; Hon. W. H. Hutchinson, Special Judge. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Opinion of the Court
by Morris, C. J. Christianson and Burr, JJ., disqualified, did not participate, Hon. M. J. Englert, Judge of First Judicial District, and Hon. Fred
Jansonius, Judge of Fourth Judicial District, sitting in their stead.
In Albert T. Schmidt, Pltf. and Respt., vs. North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, Deft. and Applt.
That when the Workmen's Compensation Bureau entertains an application to share in the Workmen's Compensation fund and determines that
the applicant is an employee, was injured in the course of his employment,
and, upon hearing, awards him compensation, it has an exclusive continu-
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ing jurisdiction over the case and over the right of the employee to share
further in the fund, with power to increase or diminish the compensation
as the occasion requires.
That the district court has no jurisdiction to determine the right of
any applicant to share in the Workmen's Compensation fund except in
a case where the bureau denies compensation upon some ground going to
the basis of the claimant's right to share.
That where an applicant applies to the bureau for leave to share in
the fund upon the ground that he is suffering from a. disease which was
accelerated by his employment and the bureau denies his claim on the
ground the alleged disability is not due to a disease proximately caused by
his employment, and upon appeal to the district court the applicant attempts to prove injuries resulting from an alleged accident and the record
shows that no application was ever made to the bureau for compensation
because of said accident and no claim for compensation because of such
injuries was ever submitted to the bureau for its determination and the
bureau had no opportunity to pass upon such question, it is error for the
district court to hear and determine the issue of compensation because of
such accident. The applicant must first submit such question to the bureau
for its determination.
Appeal from the judgment of the district court of Burleigh County,
Jansonius, J. REVERSED. Opinion of the court by Burr, J.
In New York Life Insurance Company, a corporation, Pltf. and Respt.,
vs. Peggy Fleck, LeRoy Fleet, et al., Defts. and Applts.
That misrepresentation of material facts, made in an application for
an insurance policy, will void a policy issued in reliance thereupon when
such misrepresentations increase the risk of loss.
Appeal from the judgment of the District Court of Stark County,
Miller, J. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, J. Christianson,
J, spec. concurring.
In Sam A. Wilson, Pltf. and Respt., vs. Oscar H. Kjorlie Company,
Deft. and Applt.
That where a guest of the driver of an automobile is injured in a collision between the car in which he is riding and another motor vehicle
which was caused by the negligence of the operator of the latter, contributory negligence of the host is not imputable to the guest but if the guest
is guilty of contributory negligence it bars his recovery.
That where recovery is sought for loss of earnings in an action for
damages resulting from personal injuries sustained by the operator of an
established business which is largely dependent on his own exertions, it is
error to admit evidence of profits or net income without laying a proper
foundation by showing such preliminary facts as the character and magnitude of the business, capital employed, employees hired and the nature and
amount of service rendered by them as well as the plaintiff -himself.
Appeal from the judgment of the District Court of Cass County, and
from an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
or for a new trial. Holt, J. NEW TRIAL GRANTED. Opinion of the
court by Morris, Ch. J.
In Aaron Sukut, Pit, and Applt., vs. Gottlob Sukut, Deft. and Respt.
That a judgment rendered by a court of general jurisdiction, having
jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter, imports absolute verity.
As long as it stands, it can not be attacked collaterally 'by any of the parties
thereto, or those in privity with them. Tuttle v. Tuttle, 48 N. D. 10, 181
N. W. 898 followed.
That where such a judgment has been rendered and has determined
the rights of the parties with reference to lands and the crops grown thereon, a party thereto can not defend against the judgment of the court
with reference to such crops on the ground that prior -to the entry of the
judgment agreement had been entered into between the parties as to the
disposition of said crop; and the party relying upon said judgment may en-
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force his rights thereunder without reference to any of the terms of the
alleged prior agreement. Appeal from an order of the District Court of
Logan County, Coyne, J. REVERSED. Opinion of the court by Burr, J.

STEPS IN THE PREPARATION OF A LAWSUIT
Errata:-

(Continued From November Issue)
In third line of first paragraph after word "maker"
change word "the" to "for"

PERSONAL EXAMINATION OF SITE, SCENE
OR MATERIAL OBJECT INVOLVED
If the case involves facts concerning any structure or a
building, or any material object or the scene of a crime about which
testimony will be developed, to give the jury or the court a better
understanding of the situation, an examination by the attorney
trying the case of the scene, the structure, the site, or the object
is a very helpful aid in the trial of the case, and aids the attorney
in getting the facts clearly and logically before the jury. It
enables the attorney to get a better grasp of the facts and he
can ask his questions more intelligently and more directly to
bring out those things which will help the jury to get a picture
of the surroundings, or the situation. Without such examination
by the attorney, he is apt to be attempting to clear his own ideas
of the scene or the structure while he is examining the witness,
and of course, he cannot ask questions that clearly bring out
the facts without having a mental grasp of the scene, site, or
object. Photographs procured shortly after the incident, or of
the scene, are also of material aid to give the picture of the
situation. A mental picture based upon a photograph or a snapshot is much more vivid than a mere word description, no matter
how well rendered. Examination of the site of an automobile
accident, particularly if this can be done while the cars are still
in their original location right after the accident, a building involved in an arson case, or the scene of a crime, are without a
doubt very helpful in getting a case properly prepared for trial.
In fact, in many cases, such examination is absolutely essential
to the careful and intelligent preparation of a case.
SEARCH FOR AND EXAMINE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Many cases involve documentary evidence. This evidence
should be first carefully checked as to its materiality. If there
is any indication that documentary evidence exists which is
not in the possession of client, such documentary evidence, if
it does exist, should be located for use in the trial of the case.
Failure to locate documentary evidence is often due to lack of
diligence in searching. Sometimes clients have documentary evidence available that they have not examined themselves and do
not even know exists. So it is sometimes necessary to prod
clients to search their own records for documents that are or may
become necessary in a trial. For instance, in court cases involving tax proceedings, it is important to find all documents that
are involved in the proceedings. In tax matters, actions involving tax titles, quiet title actions, and foreclosure actions, it is
very helpful to check all the records available at the courthouse
in the county in which the land involved is located, or in which

